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Fungibility, Labels, and Consumption
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Fungibility of money is a central principle in economics. It implies that any unit of money is 
substitutable for another and that the composition of income is irrelevant for consumption. 
We find in a field experiment that even in a simple, incentivized setup many subjects do not 
treat money as fungible. When a label is attached to a part of their budget, subjects change 
consumption according to the suggestion of the label. A controlled laboratory experiment 
confirms this result and further shows that subjects with lower mathematical abilities are more 
likely to violate fungibility. The findings lend support to behavioral models such as narrow 
bracketing or mental accounting. One implication of our results is that in-kind benefits distort 
consumption more than usually assumed. 
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Fungibility of money is a central principle in economics. It implies that any unit of
money is substitutable for another. In the analysis of consumer choice, for example,
fungibility prescribes that consumption decisions are based exclusively on the con-
sumer's total wealth|its composition is irrelevant (Modigliani & Brumberg 1954).
Fungibility is assumed throughout most of economic theory. Some empirical ndings,
however, cast doubt on the generality of the concept. Odean (1998), for example, an-
alyzes stock market behavior of individual investors and nds that investors sell win-
ning stocks too soon and keep losing stocks too long. He explains this nding by as-
suming that investors evaluate each stock holding separately (i.e., treat them as non-
fungible) and are loss averse in each stock holding with respect to the buying price.
Other examples come from the elds of asset pricing (Benartzi & Thaler 1995, Bar-
beris et al. 2001), stock market participation (Barberis et al. 2006), stock trading
(Barberis & Huang 2001), and life-cycle saving (Shefrin & Thaler 1988). Despite the
fundamental importance of fungibility, surprisingly little is known about the degree
to which individual decision-making is in line with the notion of fungibility.
In this paper, we investigate whether individuals treat dierent income sources
as fungible using a combination of a natural eld experiment and a controlled labo-
ratory experiment. Both studies have the same general design: the consumer has a
cash budget and an additional lump-sum subsidy of amount S at his disposal. In the
Cash treatment, the subsidy S is given in cash. In the Label treatment, the subsidy
is given as in-kind benet, i.e., the subsidy has to be spent on the subsidized good.
The crucial feature of our design is that the optimal consumption of the subsidized
good exceeds the amount of the subsidy. By shifting the remaining budget, the con-
sumer can reach the same rst-best consumption level in both treatments, i.e. the
subsidy is inframarginal and not distortionary. Therefore, treatments merely dier
in the label attached to the subsidy; rational consumers should not be in
uenced
by whether the subsidy is given as cash or in kind. Standard theory thus predicts
consumption to be the same in both treatments. In contrast, a consumer who does
not treat dierent income sources as fungible will spend the in-kind subsidy fully on
the subsidized good and thus consume too much of this good. If consumption of the
subsidized good is higher in the Label treatment, we can conclude that behavior is
not in line with the principle of fungibility.
The eld experiment was conducted in a wine restaurant. Guests received either
a voucher for the whole bill (Cash treatment) or a voucher of the same amount
that had to be used for beverage consumption (Label treatment). The value of the
1voucher was lower than the usual beverage consumption of almost all guests. In a
restaurant, guests consume at least a minimal amount of two distinct goods (eat-
ing and drinking). Thus, an in-kind voucher of a lower amount than this minimal
amount does not distort the optimal decision. The eld experiment allows us to
collect natural decision data in a controlled way. In the terminology of Harrison
& List (2004) the experiment is a \natural eld experiment": participants acted in
a natural, incentivized, and well-known environment. Additionally, they were not
aware that they participated in an experiment and therefore did not feel observed.
They could not self-select into treatments as these were exogenously assigned. Par-
ticipants could not even self-select into the experiment in general since vouchers
were not advertised and came as a surprise to participants after they had entered
the restaurant.2
The laboratory experiment has the same general design as the eld experiment
and oers an even more controlled and well-dened setup. Subjects could con-
sume two goods and had at their disposal a cash budget and either a cash subsidy
(Cash treatment) or an in-kind subsidy (Label treatment).3 We induced a stan-
dard microeconomic utility function by specifying monetary payos for the possible
consumption bundles. Importantly, the parameters were chosen such that the in-
kind subsidy is inframarginal: the amount of the subsidy is lower than the amount
spent on the subsidized good in the (rst-best) optimum for every subject. This is
a major advantage compared to eld data where the exact utility function cannot
be known and the individual budget varies. Since we know the optimal decision
in the laboratory, we can also compare actual decisions to the optimum and calcu-
late an individual error. Additionally, it is possible to collect further information
about subjects and to analyze the channels of a potential treatment eect. Field
and laboratory experiment are thus methodological complements.
The results of both experiments show that fungibility is violated in the settings
under investigation. In the eld experiment, consumption of the subsidized good
(beverages) is considerably higher in the Label treatment than in the Cash treat-
ment. Guests in the Label treatment spend 3.90 euro or 25% more on the subsidized
good than guests in the Cash treatment. This eect is also large compared to the
2Self-selection because of word-of-mouth (i.e., early participants telling their neighbors) is very
unlikely: we nd that behavior is not dierent after the experiment compared to before. Since
guests did not know when the experiment ended, a self-selection induced eect should show up
also after the experiment.
3To have an additional intra-person measure of fungibility, subjects decided twice in the labo-
ratory experiment. In a rst stage, they allocated only the cash budget without the subsidy. Then
the main treatment stage followed.
2value of the voucher of 8 euro. The treatment dierence is due to the choice of
more expensive beverages: the average price per liter of consumed beverages is
3.52 euro higher in the Label treatment compared to the Cash treatment. In con-
trast, the treatment dierence in consumed beverage volume is negligible. The total
consumption (including meals) is not aected by the type of subsidy. But if we
compare guests in the Cash and in the Label treatment with guests who did not
receive either voucher, we nd that spending is higher by 3.93 euro per person when
a voucher is given.
The laboratory experiment conrms and extends the results of the eld exper-
iment. While average consumption of both goods is close to optimal in the Cash
treatment, consumption of the subsidized good is signicantly higher in the Label
treatment. Subjects in the Label treatment consume on average 15% more of the
subsidized good. Compared to a baseline stage without subsidy, subjects in the
Label treatment spend 57% of the subsidy on the subsidized good compared to only
28% in the Cash treatment. One in ve subjects in the Label treatment even spends
every additional money unit on the subsidized good, while in the Cash treatment
only one in fty subjects does so. As we are able to collect more data on subjects
in the lab than in the eld experiment, we can analyze the underlying reasons for
the treatment eect. We nd a strong impact of subjects' mathematical abilities:
subjects with higher mathematical skills (measured by their high school math grade)
act consistently with standard economic theory. By contrast, in the group of sub-
jects with lower mathematical skills, the treatment dierence is large and signicant.
This supports the view that the violation of fungibility occurs for cognitive reasons
and relates our study to recent work by Frederick (2005), Benjamin et al. (2006),
and Casari et al. (2007). These studies show that people with higher mathematical
and cognitive skills are more likely to behave in line with standard economic theory,
whereas people with lower cognitive skills tend to act in accordance with theories of
boundedly rational behavior.
Taken together, our results show that consumers do not always treat money
as fungible. This has implications for several areas of economic research. First,
our ndings lend support to eld studies that explain behavior of stock market
investors by assuming that investors are loss averse in each portfolio position (e.g.,
Odean 1998, Benartzi & Thaler 1995). These studies assume that investors evaluate
each component of their portfolio (e.g., stock vs. bond holdings) separately. We
provide a direct test of this assumption. Second, our results are important for
theories of life-cycle saving which usually rely on the assumption of fungibility.
Since we nd that even in a very simple setup fungibility does not hold for all
3subjects, our evidence supports savings models in which the assumption of fungibility
is relaxed (see, e.g., Shefrin & Thaler 1988, Barberis & Huang 2001). Furthermore,
the specic design of our study allows us to give a rationale for the observed behavior
of benets recipients. Assuming a lack of fungibility could explain why housing
benets have such a strong eect on market rents as shown by Susin (2002), Gibbons
& Manning (2006), and Fack (2006). Taking our results at face value, tenants
receiving inframarginal housing benets should be willing to pay a higher rent for
a given apartment compared to tenants who get the same amount as cash grant.
If landlords are aware of this behavior, they can exploit the existence of housing
benets to increase the rent. We discuss this issue in more detail in Section 5.
But why should people treat money as non-fungible? Tversky & Kahneman
(1981) suggest that decision makers often do not decide globally but rather evaluate
parts of a decision separately. This phenomenon has been called \narrow framing"
(Kahneman & Lovallo 1993) or \narrow bracketing" (Read et al. 1999). For the allo-
cation of a budget coming from dierent sources, making separate decisions implies
a violation of fungibility. Since assessing the decisions separately is cognitively less
demanding, our nding that subjects with lower mathematical skills are more likely
to violate fungibility also points to narrow bracketing as a potential explanation for
the treatment eect. More directly related to the consumption setup we analyze is
the concept of \mental accounting" (Thaler 1980, 1985, 1999). Mental accounting
proposes that consumers use a set of heuristics to deal with their day-to-day -
nancial decisions. Mental accounting assumes that consumers have mental budgets
for dierent expenditure categories or for dierent investment categories, thereby
constraining the fungibility of money. In this framework, a label can in
uence con-
sumption choice if it determines to which mental budget the consumer assigns the
benet payment.
Most empirical studies testing fungibility rely on non-incentivized surveys (e.g.,
Heath & Soll 1996, O'Curry 1997, Prelec & Loewenstein 1998, White 2006). Only
few papers investigate fungibility in incentivized laboratory experiments or with eld
data. Levin (1998) nds in a large household survey that the marginal propensity to
consume out of current income is higher than out of wealth; he can exclude liquidity
constraints as explanation. Milkman et al. (2007) show that customers of an online
grocer spend more when they redeem a $10-o coupon. $10 is negligibly small
compared to life-time wealth and should not alter spending behavior if customers
treat wealth and coupon as fungible. Arkes et al. (1994) nd that people spend more
when they just received a surprise gift compared to when they expected to get the
gift (see also Epley et al. 2006). In these three studies, however, the treatment eect
4could potentially be in
uenced by a change in mood because of receiving a gift. In
our study, this cannot have an impact. Finally, Gneezy & Potters (1997), Thaler
et al. (1997), and Rabin & Weizs acker (2007) show in experiments that subjects
evaluate subsequent gambles separately, i.e., treat them as non-fungible. There are,
however, also a couple of studies nding that subjects do treat dierent income
sources as fungible: for example, in an experiment by Maciejovsky et al. (2001),
subjects do not treat income dierently that they receive from selling experimental
assets or from the assets' dividends; and Mott (1989), studying the food stamps
program in Puerto Rico, nds no dierence in consumption between households who
receive inframarginal in-kind benets or cash grants.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The design of both exper-
iments is described in Section 2. Section 3 reports results of the eld experiment.
Section 4 presents results of the laboratory experiment and analyzes potential chan-




The goal of this paper is to experimentally test whether individual behavior is in
line with fungibility. We examine this question in a simple two-goods consumption
case where one good is subsidized in a particular way. Assume that a consumer
has a cash budget of amount R and a subsidy of amount S at his disposal. In the
Cash treatment, the subsidy S is given lump-sum in cash. In the Label treatment,
the subsidy has the same amount and is also given lump-sum but it has to be
spent on the subsidized good. The crucial detail of our design is that the optimal
consumption of the subsidized good is larger than the amount of the subsidy, i.e., a
rational consumer should not be in
uenced by whether the subsidy is given as cash
or in kind.
Consider the indierence curve diagram in Figure 1, where the subsidized
good (s) is on the horizontal axis and the other good (o) is on the vertical axis.
For simplicity, the price of the subsidized good is normalized to ps = 1. The dashed
line is the budget constraint in the Cash treatment. Assume that the optimal con-
sumption bundle is B. In the Label treatment, the subsidy is paid in kind; the
consumer faces a kinked budget constraint (solid line). However, the kink does not
5aect optimal decision making, as the amount of S is lower than the amount sB
spent optimally on the subsidized good. The rst-best choice B is still feasible. Un-
der the assumption that fungibility holds, consumption should therefore be identical
across treatments.
Now consider a consumer who does not treat dierent income sources as fungi-
ble. A violation of fungibility implies that the consumer has some sort of cognitive
or mental sub-budgets between which money cannot be shifted (Thaler 1985). We
assume that a labeled payment is posted to the sub-budget the label corresponds
to, whereas a cash budget is allocated optimally to the dierent sub-budgets. In the
Cash treatment, we would still expect such a consumer to choose bundle B. As both
income components are cash, the consumer can allocate the optimal amounts to the
sub-budgets for the two goods and thus choose the optimal consumption bundle.
The dierence to the standard model occurs in the Label treatment. The consumer
will still allocate the cash endowment optimally (assume that this corresponds to
bundle A). The subsidy, however, will be allocated to the sub-budget for the subsi-
dized good. Since the sub-budgets are non-fungible, the subsidy will thus be spent
entirely on the subsidized good. In the extreme case of complete non-fungibility,
this results in a consumption of bundle C where sC = sA+S (see Figure 1). If both
goods are normal, sC  sB.4
Therefore, if some subjects do not treat money as fungible, we should expect
average consumption of the subsidized good in the Label treatment to be higher
than in the Cash treatment. This does not exclude the possibility that some subjects
act in line with fungibility or that others are only in
uenced to a certain extent by
the label attached to the subsidy.
It could be that people consume dierently when they receive a gift or subsidy,
just because they are in a positive mood. Such a change in mood cannot in
uence
our main treatment comparison as subjects in both treatments get a subsidy.
4This reasoning depends on the order in which cash budget and subsidy are spent. If the
consumer spent the subsidy rst, he would be able to allocate the cash budget so as to reach
bundle B. In the experiments, we are therefore testing the joint hypothesis of fungibility and order
of spending. To minimize the in
uence of the order of spending as much as possible, subjects
in the lab experiment decided twice: rst, they allocated only the cash budget R. We will call
this stage reference stage. In a second step, called subsidy stage, subjects allocated the combined
budget R + S. The experience from the reference stage will probably lead most subjects to rst
allocate the cash endowment during the subsidy stage and then the subsidy, as they have already
calculated how to allocate the cash budget R. Additionally, this setup allows us to calculate the
consumption increase from reference to subsidy stage to get an intra-person measure of fungibility.
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Figure 1: Consumption decision with inframarginal in-kind benet. The subsidized
good (s) is on the horizontal axis, the other good (o) is on the vertical axis. The
dashed line is the budget constraint when the subsidy is given in cash. The solid line
is the budget constraint when the subsidy is given in kind. The dot-and-dash line is
the budget constraint when no subsidy is given.
2.2 Design of the Field Experiment
The eld experiment was conducted in a wine restaurant situated in a wine-growing
region of southern Germany. The restaurant itself is located in a winery. We chose
this restaurant because almost all guests eat something and drink wine and other
beverages; thus guests consume at least a minimal amount of two distinct goods.5
Giving a beverage voucher that is smaller than the minimal amount spent for bev-
erages will therefore not distort the optimal decision. Usual per-capita spending in
this restaurant is about 40 euro (54 USD).
Guests were not aware of participating in an experiment. Upon arrival at the
restaurant, they learned that the restaurant was celebrating its fourth anniversary
(which was indeed the case) and that they would receive an 8-euro voucher per
person (11 USD at the time of the experiment). The type of voucher diered by
day. On days of the Cash treatment, vouchers were given as \gourmet voucher"
that could be spent on either beverages or the meal. To avoid confusion with the
laboratory experiment, we will call this treatment Field Cash treatment (FCT). The
Field Cash treatment serves as our primary control treatment. On days of the Label
5In Germany, it is very unusual to not consume beverages in a restaurant; water must also be
purchased.
7treatment, vouchers were given as a \gourmet beverage voucher". These vouchers
could only be spent on beverages. We will refer to this treatment as Field Label
treatment. From communication with the owner of the restaurant we knew that
almost all guests consume beverages worth more than 8 euro, even without getting
a voucher. Therefore, the beverage voucher should not distort the consumption
decision of these guests; the only treatment dierence should be the label on the
voucher.6 Both types of vouchers had to be redeemed the same evening.
The restaurant distributed a total of 196 vouchers, one per person, starting with
beverage vouchers until half of the available vouchers were distributed. To avoid
distributing vouchers from both treatments on the same evening, the restaurant
continued with beverage vouchers during that evening. From the next day on, the re-
maining vouchers were issued as bill vouchers. Between treatments, observations are
thus counter-balanced over days of the week. Overall, 107 vouchers were distributed
in the FLT and 89 vouchers in the FCT. We consider each table in the restaurant as
one independent observation and calculate all absolute values per capita. Since we
distributed one voucher per person, we can relate per-capita consumption directly
to the amount of a single voucher. This leaves us with 37 independent observations
in the Field Label treatment and 34 in the Field Cash treatment. No guest par-
ticipated in both FLT and FCT. During the experiment, the menu did not change
and the same two waiters were present in the restaurant. Our data consist of the
detailed bill per table showing all consumed items and an additional questionnaire
lled in by a waiter stating how many persons correspond to this bill, the share of
women at the table, the share of persons below wine-drinking age, whether guests
paid separately and the amount of the tip.
Additionally, we collected information about the time directly before and after
the experiments to compare behavior in the two main treatments described above to
the behavior of guests who did not receive either voucher. We have data on 356 per-
sons which corresponds to 116 independent observations (76 before and 40 after the
two main treatments).7
6We could not avoid that some participants consumed less than the amount of the subsidy
because total consumption had a high variance, ranging from 18.95 euro to 84.25 euro. In the
laboratory experiment, described in the in next section, we can ensure that the subsidy is infra-
marginal for all subjects by choosing an appropriate payo function and by endowing every subject
with the same budget.
7We have the full information described above (bill and questionnaire) only for observations
after the two main treatments. For the observations before, we know only the bill and the number
of persons. Furthermore, it could be that some of these guests show up more than once in our
data.
8Results of the eld experiment are presented in Section 3.
2.3 Design of the Laboratory Experiment
In the laboratory experiment, subjects had to make two subsequent consumption
decisions. In each stage, subjects were endowed with a budget that they could
allocate on two goods. For each good, we induced a standard microeconomic utility
function by specifying monetary payos for the possible consumption levels. Total
payo was the sum of the payos for each of the two goods in both stages. The
rst decision stage, which we will call reference stage, serves to yield a reference
transaction to which decisions in the second stage can be compared. The second
stage, called subsidy stage, is our main treatment stage.
In the reference stage, subjects received a cash budget of 50 money units which
they could allocate freely on the two goods; the reference stage was identical in both
treatments. In the subsidy stage, subjects again had an endowment of 50 money
units at their disposal and additionally received a subsidy of 30 money units. The
only dierence between the two treatments was the type of the subsidy. In the Lab
Cash treatment (LCT), the subsidy was given as an unconditional cash grant. In
the Lab Label treatment (LLT), the subsidy was given as an in-kind benet, i.e., the
money had to be spent entirely on the subsidized good. Parameters were chosen such
that the in-kind benet was inframarginal for all subjects and not distortionary. By
shifting the remainder of their budget appropriately, subjects could reach the same
optimal consumption bundle as in the LCT. The only treatment dierence therefore
was the label attached to the subsidy.
The exact specication of the payo functions is presented in Table 1. For each
good, the payo is increasing in consumption and the marginal payo is weakly
decreasing. Prices per unit were ps = 3 for the subsidized good and po = 2 for the
other good. Payo functions and prices were the same in both stages. Unspent
budget could neither be saved nor did it yield any payo. There was no time limit
for decisions. For these parameters, the consumption bundles (s;o) displayed in
Figure 1 are as follows: the optimal consumption bundle in the reference stage is
A = (12;7); the optimal bundle in the subsidy stage is B = (13;20); the bundle C
is (22;7).
In order to make the dierence between the initial endowment and the subsidy
payment more salient, subjects had to earn their endowment in a real-eort task.
Before consumption decisions were taken, subjects had to count the number of zeros
in large spreadsheets that consisted of zeros and ones. When they managed to count
9Consumed units 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Payo
Subsidized good 0 36 70 102 132 160 186 210 232 252 270 286 299
Other good 0 30 57 81 102 120 135 147 157 166 175 184 192
Consumed units 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Payo
Subsidized good 310 316 322 328 333 338 343 347 351 355 358 361 364
Other good 200 208 216 223 230 237 244 251 256 261 266 271 276
Table 1: Payo functions in the laboratory experiment. \Subsidized good" denotes
the good that is subsidized in the second stage of the Lab Label treatment. Payo
points were converted into real money after the experiment.
the correct number of zeros in a given amount of time they earned 100 money units
that were later split in half for the two consumption decisions.8 One subject failed
to complete the task on time and is henceforth excluded from the analysis. We
chose this rather boring activity to minimize the intrinsic motivation subjects could
have for the task and thus to strengthen their perception of really having earned the
money (cf. Cherry et al. 2002).
Subjects were students from the University of Bonn studying various majors ex-
cept Economics. Treatments were assigned randomly and no subject participated
in more than one treatment. At the beginning of the experiment, instructions were
read aloud and subjects had to answer a number of control questions to ensure that
they understood the task.9 Detailed instructions for the two stages were given later
on the computer screen. This allowed us to have subjects of both treatments in the
same session and thus to align the delivery of the two treatments as much as possible.
At the end of the experiment, subjects answered a questionnaire. The experiment
was computerized using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). 92 subjects partic-
ipated in the experiment, one of whom failed to complete the real-eort task. This
leaves us with 45 independent observations in the Lab Cash treatment and 46 ob-
servations in the Lab Label treatment. Payo points (cf. Table 1) were transformed
into real money at a rate of 100 points = 1 euro. In addition to their earnings from
8The precise rules were as follows: subjects got 8 large tables with 300 entries each. To complete
the task, they had to count the correct number of zeros on four sheets within 15 minutes. An answer
was also counted as correct if the number reported diered only by 1 from the true number. If
subjects did not complete the task, they got an endowment of 10 money units only.
9See Appendix A for an English translation of the instructions.
10the consumption decisions, subjects received a show-up fee of 2.50 euro. On average,
subjects earned 12.20 euro (14.80 USD at the time of the experiment). Sessions
lasted between 60 and 70 minutes.
Results of the laboratory experiment are presented in Section 4.
3 Results of the Field Experiment
In this section, we report results of the eld experiment. First we show that con-
sumption of the subsidized good (beverages) is higher in the Field Label treatment
than in the Field Cash treatment. Guests do not drink more in terms of volume
but consume more expensive beverages. Total consumption, including meals, is not
aected by the type of subsidy but spending is higher compared to when no voucher
is given.
Result 1: Spending on the subsidized good (beverages) is signicantly higher
in the Field Label treatment than in the Field Cash treatment.
Participants in the Cash treatment who receive a bill voucher spend on average
15.04 euro per capita on beverages (alcoholic and non-alcoholic). Participants in
the Label treatment spend 18.94 euro on beverages. The treatment dierence of
3.90 euro is very high considering the value of the subsidy (8 euro); the marginal
eect is 25%. When we regress per-capita beverage consumption on a treatment
dummy, the p-value is 0.052 (column 1 of Table 2). In a regression with controls for
the share of women, share of persons below wine-drinking age, day of the week, and
outside temperature, the treatment coecient rises to 4.57 euro and the p-value
goes down to 0.040 (column 2). The treatment dierence is also signicant in a
non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test (p = 0:085).10
Unfortunately, we don't have information on one important predictor of con-
sumption: total wealth (in terms of Figure 1, we cannot observe R). We pursue two
alternative approaches to address this problem. First, we take meal consumption as
proxy for total wealth: if richer people consume more beverages they should also
consume more meals. We regress absolute beverage consumption per capita on a
treatment dummy and control for meal consumption per capita. The coecient of
the treatment dummy rises to 4.90 euro and has now a p-value of 0.006 (column 3
of Table 2). This result holds when we add the controls mentioned above to the
regression (column 4). A second possibility is to regress the share of beverage con-
10All tests reported in this paper are two sided.
11sumption on a treatment dummy and controls (columns 5 and 6 of Table 2). These
regressions also show a highly signicant impact of the treatment: giving a bever-
age voucher instead of a bill voucher increases the share of beverage consumption
by 7.9 percentage points (from 33.7 percent; p = 0:004). In a regression with the
controls described above (excluding meal consumption), the treatment eect goes
up to 8.7 percentage points (p = 0:004). The dierence in beverage shares is also
signicant in a U-test (p = 0:013). All these results and the results in the following
regressions continue to hold if we drop the assumption that all observations are in-
dependent and instead only assume independence across days (by calculating robust
standard errors clustered on day).11
Since the restaurant rst distributed all beverage vouchers and then all bill vouch-
ers, it might be that the treatment dierence in beverage consumption is driven by
an overall (falling) time trend. We can test this potential confound with the data
we collected before and after the two main treatments; here, guests did not receive
either voucher. If a time trend existed, it should also show up in this data. This
is, however, not the case. Participants after the two main treatments spend even a
little bit more on beverages (16.27 vs. 15.38 euro) but this dierence is not signi-
cant, neither in a U-test (p = 0:521), nor in regressions with or without the controls
described above12 (p = 0:863 and p = 0:562). There is also no signicant time trend
in total consumption or in the share of beverage consumption. 13
Taken together, participants in our eld experiment do not treat vouchers and
wealth as completely fungible. Next, we analyze how the additional spending on
the subsidized good in the Label treatment is used. Do participants consume a
larger volume of beverages or do they consume more expensive beverages? Our
data support the latter hypothesis.
11The results also hold if we exclude tables that pay separately (only very few do so). The
number of persons at a table also plays no role.
12Excluding share of women and share of kids, as we have this data only for observations after
the two main treatments.
13This result also speaks against a potential self-selection into the experiment because of word-
of-mouth. It could be that early participants tell their neighbors about the vouchers and that
these neighbors come to the restaurant to benet from the vouchers. If this were true and if the
neighbors had dierent consumption patterns, this could in
uence our treatment comparison. As
restaurant guests did not know when the experiment ended, this would imply that we should also
nd an eect in the comparison of consumption behavior before and after the experiment. As










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































13Result 2: The volume of the consumed beverages does not depend on the
type of subsidy given. By contrast, price per volume of the subsidized good
is higher in the Field Label treatment.
Participants in the Cash treatment drink on average 0.807 ltr of beverages (alcoholic
and non-alcoholic) while participants in the Label treatment drink 0.857 ltr. The
dierence of 0.050 ltr (about 2 
 oz) is neither signicant in a non-parametric U-test
(p = 0:420) nor in OLS regressions with or without controls (see columns 1 and 2 of
Table 3). In contrast, participants in the Label treatment consume more expensive
beverages. The average price per liter is 21.91 euro/ltr in the Field Label treatment,
while it is 18.39 euro/ltr in the Field Cash treatment. This dierence of 3.52 euro is
statistically signicant (U-test, p = 0:045). In an OLS regression without controls,
the p-value is 0:026; in a regression with the controls described above, the coecient
rises to 3.89 euro and the p-value is 0:022 (see columns 3 and 4 of Table 3).14 We
nd the same pattern if we analyze the most expensive beverage item ordered. This
item cost on average 12.20 euro in the Cash treatment and 19.93 euro in the Label
treatment (U-test, p = 0:003).
So far we have argued that receiving a beverage voucher compared to a bill
voucher should not alter consumption behavior if guests treated dierent income
sources as fungible. The same argument can also be applied to the comparison of
guests who receive either voucher and guests who do not receive such a subsidy. The
8 euro increase in lifetime income (by receiving the voucher) can surely be neglected.
According to standard theory, we should not expect consumption to be in
uenced by
receiving a voucher. Our data shows, however, that also in this comparison guests
do not treat income sources as completely fungible.15
Result 3: Overall spending is higher in both subsidy treatments (FCT and
FLT) compared to when no subsidy is given.
Directly before and after the two main treatments we collected data of guests who did
not receive a voucher. These guests spend on average 39.87 euro per capita. Guests
in our two main treatments spend on average 3.93 euro more.16 This dierence is
14One table in the FCT did not consume any beverages and is excluded from this analysis. All
other results stay the same if we exclude this observation also for those analyses.
15Keep in mind that this eect could be in
uenced by a change in mood: when you get a gift you
might be inclined to spend more, just because you are happy. The results so far and the results of
the laboratory experiment cannot be in
uenced by mood.
16Average total consumption is not dierent between the two main treatments. In the Field Cash























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































15not signicant in a U-test (p = 0:157) but in an OLS regression (p = 0:059, see
Table 4, column 1). If we control for day of the week and outside temperature, the
treatment eect rises to 4.92 euro and remains signicant (p = 0:080, column 2).17
Spending on beverages is also in
uenced by receiving a voucher. Since we expect a
dierent impact on spending behavior according to the type of voucher, we regress
absolute beverage consumption on two treatment dummies, one for the FLT and
one for the FCT (Table 4, columns 3{6). Without controls, receiving a beverage
voucher increases beverage consumption by 3.25 euro. This dierence is signicant
(p = 0:032) and remains signicant if we add the controls described above and/or
if we control for meal consumption. The dierence is also signicant in a U-test
(p = 0:041). In contrast, beverage consumption is not signicantly higher when
guests receive a bill voucher (see Table 4, columns 3{6; U-test, p = 0:900). The point
estimate is even negative in some specications. Apparently, guests who receive a
bill voucher focus almost all additional spending on meals. This is also the reason
why the share of beverage consumption is lower in the Cash treatment compared to
guests without voucher (see Table 4, columns 7 and 8). In the Label treatment, the
share of beverage consumption is higher compared to guests without voucher but
not signicantly. Our results on the comparison between guests with and without
voucher are in line with ndings of Milkman et al. (2007). They analyze data from
an online grocer when customers redeem a $10-o coupon compared to when they
don't. Controlling for customer xed eects, they nd that customers spend on
average $1.87 more when they redeem such a subsidy.
Because of the high variance in total per-capita consumption, we could not ex-
clude the possibility that some guests would like to consume less than the amount of
the voucher, i.e., that their decisions are distorted. Indeed, in 16% of observations
in the Field Cash treatment and of observations without voucher, absolute beverage
consumption is lower than the value of the voucher. To avoid these distortions, we
sort all observations by per-capita beverage consumption and exclude the lowest
16% in each treatment. In the resulting sample, the subsidy is inframarginal and
treatment spend 44.80 euro. This dierence is neither signicant in a U-test (p = 0:645), nor in
regressions with our without controls (see Table 2, columns 7 and 8). The amount of tip is also not
dierent between the two main treatments and also not dierent compared to when no voucher is
given (U-tests, FLT/FCT: p = 0:416, FLT/no voucher: p = 0:327, FCT/no voucher: p = 0:777).
In Germany, there is no strong norm about how much tip to give; tipping in our data ranges from
0% to 12.5% of the amount of the bill.
17We do not have information about the share of women and the share of persons below wine-
drinking age for observations before the experiment, thus we cannot control for these variables like













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































17non-distortionary for all participants. As shown in Tables 5 and 6, the distortions
cause only a small part of the treatment dierences and overall results remain very
similar. The treatment dierence between Label and Cash treatment in absolute
beverage consumption is now between 3.40 and 4.53 euro depending on the exact
specication (Table 5, columns 1{4). In the full sample, this eect was between 3.90
and 5.11 euro (see Table 2). The treatment eect remains signicant (except for
column 2). The share of beverage consumption increases by about 6.5 percentage
points from Cash to Label treatment (full sample: 7.9 to 8.7 percentage points). We
also obtain very similar results if we repeat the comparisons between guests who did
or did not receive a voucher (see Tables 4 and 6): receiving a subsidy now increases
consumption by 3.90 to 3.79 euro (full sample: 3.93 to 4.92 euro). The impact of
a beverage voucher on beverage consumption compared to guest without voucher is
now between 3.16 and 3.44 euro (full sample: 2.51 to 3.89 euro). Signicance levels
stay the same in most specications.
Although it is reassuring to see that distorted participants do not drive the
treatment dierence in our eld experiment, we would like to conrm the results in
a setting where we can guarantee that the subsidy is inframarginal for all subjects.
In a laboratory experiment, this is possible: we know budget and optimal decision
and both are the same for all subjects.
4 Results of the Laboratory Experiment
In this section we report results from the laboratory experiment. First, we show
that giving a labeled subsidy instead of a cash grant increases consumption of the
subsidized good. Then we present evidence that this eect is stronger for subjects
with lower mathematical abilities. Finally, we demonstrate that subjects' moral
concerns cannot explain the treatment eect.
4.1 Consumption in the Experiment
The lab experiment consisted of two stages: in the reference stage, subjects allocated
only a cash budget; in the subsequent subsidy stage, subjects had again the cash
budget and an additional subsidy at their disposal. The total budget was identical
for every subject. Before we turn to the subsidy stage, we analyze consumption
decisions in the reference stage. The design of the reference stage was the same








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Consumption of the subsidized good in the reference stage. A consumption
of 12 units maximizes payo.
would be two dierent treatments in the subsidy stage. Figure 2 shows a histogram
of consumption choices for the (later to be) subsidized good. Choices in the Lab
Cash treatment are represented by grey bars; choices in the Lab Label treatment
are represented by black bars. We nd that decisions are very similar: the modal
choice in both treatments is the optimum of 12 units. On average, subjects in the
Lab Label treatment consume 11:0 units of the subsidized good, while subjects in
the Lab Cash treatment consume 11:6 units. Subjects apparently have no prob-
lem understanding the decision and take the decision seriously. We are therefore
condent that the experimental situation allows for meaningful interpretation and
that the experimental incentives work. OLS regressions show that consumption is
not dierent between treatments (see Table 7: column 1 without controls, column 2
with controls for age and gender).18
Next, we focus on outcomes in the subsidy stage. Our rst result concerns the
impact of the labeled subsidy on consumption choice and conrms the main nding
18A U-test between treatments is, however, signicant (p = 0:066). Still, this does not com-
promise our results for several reasons: rst, in terms of prots, there is virtually no treatment
dierence (U-test, p = 0:983). Second, the absolute distance to the optimum is not dierent be-
tween treatments (U-test, p = 0:577). Finally, consumption is slightly lower in the Lab Label
treatment. Thus, if there is any inertia in subjects' decisions, results from the reference stage work
against a potential treatment eect in the subsidy stage, making our results even stronger.
21of the eld experiment.
Result 4: Consumption of the subsidized good is signicantly higher in the
Lab Label treatment. The marginal propensity to consume out of the subsidy
is twice as large in the Lab Label treatment as in the Lab Cash treatment.
A histogram of consumption choices in the subsidy stage is shown in Figure 3.
Recall that the experiment is designed such that the same optimal consumption
bundle can be reached in both treatments. If all subjects acted in line with fun-
gibility, there should be no treatment dierence. In the Cash treatment, we nd
that the modal choice is to consume the optimal amount of the subsidized good
(13 units), and average consumption is 14:4 units.19 In the Label treatment, by
contrast, a consumption of an amount of 20 units is the most frequent choice and
only a relatively small share of subjects choose the payo-maximizing amount of
13 units. Overall, subjects in the Label treatment buy too much of the subsidized
good, consuming 16:7 units on average; the marginal eect is 15%. The treatment
dierence is highly signicant (U-test, p = 0:006). Moreover, subjects in the Label
treatment leave money on the table, as their choices translate into signicantly lower
payos (U-test, p = 0:014). In Table 7 we provide OLS estimates of the treatment
eect. The estimates in columns 3 and 4 show that the treatment dummy is positive
and highly signicant. The coecient has a value of about 2.3 consumption units
(p = 0:006) and remains unaected when we control for age and gender.20 To check
the robustness of this nding we analyze an additional measure of performance: the
absolute distance from the optimal consumption level. This measure also treats too
low consumption as error. On average, subjects in the Cash treatment choose a
consumption level that is 2.44 units away from the optimum; subjects in the Label
treatment are on average 4.35 units away from the same optimum. The dierence
is signicant (U-test, p = 0:004).
The two-stage design of our experiment enables us to compute an intra-person
measure of fungibility by comparing decisions in the subsidy stage to decisions in the
reference stage. A histogram of the intra-person change in consumption is shown in
Figure 4. On average, the consumption increase in the Cash treatment is 2.8 units.
19Very few subjects in the subsidy stage choose a consumption bundle that is not on the Pareto
frontier (one in the LLT and two in the LCT). For ease of exposition, we report only the consump-
tion of the subsidized good. Consumption of the other good can then be readily calculated. Our
results do not change if we conne the analysis to the Pareto optimal choices.
20All regression results in Table 7 remain virtually unchanged if we perform tobit regressions























Figure 3: Consumption of the subsidized good in the subsidy stage. A consumption
of 13 units maximizes payo.
In contrast, the average consumption increase in the Label treatment is 5:7 units.
This dierence-in-dierence is highly signicant (U-test, p = 0:001).21 We can also
express the consumption increase in terms of marginal propensity to consume the
subsidized good (MPC). As the subsidy payment has a value of 10 units of the
subsidized good and as the additional subsidy is the only budget change between
the reference and the subsidy stage, the resulting MPC out of the subsidy is 0:574
in the Label treatment and 0:280 in the Cash treatment. Attaching a label to the
subsidy therefore doubles the MPC out of the subsidy.
Our next result documents the considerable heterogeneity we observe in behavior
across individuals.
Result 5: The treatment dierence is mainly driven by subjects who in-
crease their consumption by the full amount of the subsidy.
Figure 4 shows that the most frequent choice in the Cash treatment is a consumption
increase by either 1 or 2 units. In contrast, the modal choice in the Label treatment
is a consumption increase by 10 units, i.e., these subjects spend the entire subsidy on
the subsidized good, on top of the consumption from the reference stage. Subjects
who treat income sources as completely non-fungible will do exactly this (cf. bundle
21The increase from reference to subsidy stage of absolute distance to the optimal consumption





















Figure 4: Consumption increase of the subsidized good from reference stage to
subsidy stage. The subsidy is worth 10 units of the subsidized good.
C in Figure 1). In the Label treatment, 22% of subjects spend the whole subsidy on
the subsidized good, while this is true for only 2% of subjects in the Cash treatment.
These subjects drive most of the treatment eect, but not all of it. If we exclude
these subjects from the analysis, the treatment dierence in absolute consumption
remains, although it is considerably smaller (1:4 units, previously 2:3 units; U-test,
p = 0:089). The same is true for the treatment dierence in consumption change
(1:9 units, previously 2:9 units; U-test, p = 0:020).
Interestingly, subjects who spend the entire subsidy on the subsidized good de-
cide much faster than the remaining subjects. They need on average 107 sec for
their decision, whereas the other subjects need 234 sec, more than twice as long
(U-test, p = 0:001). This dierence suggests that spending the subsidy fully on the
subsidized good is the result of a simple decision heuristic (like mental accounting)
rather than extensive deliberations. As a consequence of their consumption deci-
sion, subjects who spend the entire subsidy on the subsidized good earn less than
all other subjects (U-test: p = 0:001) and also less than the other subjects in the











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































254.2 Impact of Mathematical Abilities
A consumer who does not treat dierent income components as fungible reduces the
complexity of the consumption decision. In our setup, ignoring fungibility divides
the rather complex two-good decision into two simple one-dimensional problems.
Subjects with lower mathematical skills will have a larger gain from reducing the
complexity of the decision. We therefore expect these subjects to violate fungibility
more often and, as a consequence, to be more in
uenced by the treatment manip-
ulation. We mentioned in Section 1 that a consumer who brackets his decisions
narrowly, i.e., who does not decide globally, will violate fungibility. Read et al.
(1999) conjecture that narrow bracketing is negatively correlated with cognitive and
mathematical abilities.22 Our next result supports their intuition. To analyze the
interplay of cognitive abilities and the treatment eect, we use subjects' math grade
in their nal high school exam as a proxy for their cognitive and mathematical
abilities.
Result 6: The treatment dierence in consumption is larger for subjects
with lower mathematical abilities.
The grades were elicited in the post-experimental questionnaire. We split the sample
at the median according to math grade, leading to a \High-Math" group (n= 50) and
a \Low-Math" group (n=41). Since mathematical abilities might not only in
uence
the decision in the Label treatment but also in the Cash treatment, we compare
the treatment dierence within the High-Math group to the dierence within the
Low-Math group.
Figure 5 presents cumulative percentages of consumption decisions in both treat-
ments. In the High-Math group (left panel), cumulative distributions are very close
to each other. In contrast, in the Low-Math group (right panel), there is a wide
gap between the two distributions. The treatment eect in the High-Math group
is 0.9 units (U-test, p = 0:357). The treatment eect in the Low-Math group of
3.8 units is considerably larger (U-test, p = 0:004). We test whether the dierence
between treatment eects is statistically signicant in OLS regressions. Results are
presented in Table 7, columns 5 and 6. The dependent variable is the consumption
of the subsidized good. As explanatory variables we include a treatment dummy
(=1 if Label treatment), a Math dummy (=1 if Low-Math) and the interaction
22Thaler (1985) argues that mental accounting, a concept similar to narrow bracketing, serves
as a heuristic to overcome problems of limited self-control. In our experiment, limited self-control
plays no role. Subjects with lower cognitive abilities should be less likely to realize this fact and
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Figure 5: Cumulative distribution of the consumption of the subsidized good for
High-Math group (left panel) and Low-Math group (right panel). The grey line always
depicts consumption in the Cash treatment, the black line consumption in the Label
treatment. In order to form a High-Math group (n=50) and a Low-Math group
(n=41) we elicited the math grades subjects obtained in their nal high school exam
and split the sample at the median.
of the two. Compared to regressions without controls for mathematical abilities
(columns 3 and 4), the treatment dummy is much smaller and insignicant. This
indicates that subjects in the High-Math group (the reference category) do not act
dierently across treatments. In contrast, the coecient of the interaction term is
large (2.9 units) and signicant. Controlling for age and gender leaves the signif-
icance level unaected, and the coecient increases slightly. Thus, the treatment
eect is signicantly larger for subjects who belong to the Low-Math group. We
obtain the same result if we ignore the Cash treatment and directly compare con-
sumption of High-Math and Low-Math subjects in the Label treatment. Low-Math
subjects consume on average 2.1 units more of the subsidized good than High-Math
subjects (U-test, p = 0:066). All these results hold if we take absolute distance to
the optimal consumption as dependent variable.23
We have shown before that subjects who spend the whole subsidy on the sub-
sidized good account for a large part of the treatment eect. The relation we have
just shown between mathematical abilities and consumption in the subsidy stage
holds also for these subjects. 90% of subjects who spend the entire subsidy on the
subsidized good belong to the Low-Math group. Among all other subjects, this
share is only 39.5%.
23In the German high school system, there are two types of math course: intensive and basic
course (Leistungskurs and Grundkurs). If we control for subjects' course results are similar.
274.3 Moral Obligation as an Alternative Explanation?
So far we have attributed the treatment dierence to cognitive limitations that
prevent subjects from treating the two income components as fungible. However,
one could also imagine that receiving a benet payment causes a feeling of moral
obligation to spend the money in accordance with the benet giver's intention. In
response to the intention that is conveyed by the label, recipients might increase their
consumption of the subsidized good above the level they would have chosen if they
had received the same amount as an unconditional cash payment. This reasoning
cannot explain the behavioral patterns according to mathematical ability that we
presented in the last section (unless one makes the rather strong assumption that
mathematical abilities and moral attitudes are negatively correlated). But perhaps
a feeling of moral obligation could be an additional factor in
uencing behavior.
The next result shows, however, that behavior in the experiment is not related to
subjects' attitudes towards moral obligation.
Result 7: A feeling of moral obligation to comply with the label on the
subsidy cannot explain the treatment dierence in consumption.
To measure subjects' attitude regarding moral obligation, we included a scenario in
the post-experimental questionnaire in which subjects had to judge the behavior of
a ctitious person. The scenario reads as follows (translated from German):
Mr and Mrs Miller have two children (5 and 8 years old). They earn
a total amount of 2000 euro per month, after taxes. Additionally, they
receive 180 euro child benet per child, i.e., a total of 360 euro per month.
Usually, they spend about 300 euro per month for their children (child
clothing, toys, etc.). They spend the rest of the child benet on other
things (e.g., their own hobbies).
Subjects had to indicate on a point scale from 1 to 6 how they judge the ctitious
persons' behavior, 1 indicating \not appropriate at all" and 6 indicating \completely
appropriate". Thus, a higher number indicates a weaker feeling of moral obligation.
The decision situation described in the scenario above is very similar to the con-
sumption decision in our experiment. In both situations, the intended use of the
subsidy is obvious but the subsidy is not binding, i.e., a rational decision maker
should not be in
uenced by the label attached to the subsidy.24
24The questionnaire included two other scenarios concerning (i) a person claiming student sup-
port provided by the state in spite of not being entitled to it, and (ii) a person temporarily claiming
28Analogous to our analysis of mathematical abilities, we split the sample at the
median. This results in a group with strong moral obligation (\High-MO", n=38)
and a group with weak moral obligation (\Low-MO", n=53). The cumulative per-
centages for both groups are shown in Figure 6. In both panels, the cumulative
distributions are equally far from each other, indicating that the eect of the label
does not depend on the moral concerns of the subjects. The treatment eect is
essentially the same in both High-MO and Low-MO group (2.3 vs. 2.1 units); the
signicance levels of U-tests within each group are p = 0:119 and p = 0:057. This
result is conrmed by a regression analysis. Columns 7 and 8 of Table 7 include a
dummy equal to one if a subject is in the High-MO group and an interaction term
between the treatment dummy and the High-MO dummy. We nd that, in contrast
to the math regressions in columns 5 and 6, the coecient on the treatment dummy
remains large (2.1 units) and signicant. This indicates that also subjects with weak
moral obligation are in
uenced by the label on the subsidy. Moreover, the inter-
action term is small (0.2 units) and far from being signicant. Thus, the group of
subjects with stronger moral obligation does not show a larger treatment eect.25
This holds true if we focus on the subjects who spend the whole subsidy on the sub-
sidized good in addition to their consumption in the reference stage. These subjects
do not dier in their moral obligation from other subjects (U-test, p = 0:298). Taken
together, these results indicate that moral obligation does not drive the treatment
eect in the lab experiment.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we pursued a dual research strategy by combining a natural eld
experiment and an incentivized laboratory experiment to test whether consumers
treat dierent income sources as fungible. Both experiments yield the same results:
even in a simple setup, many subjects do not act in line with fungibility. This eect
is stronger for persons with lower mathematical skills. Dierences in preferences,
e.g, concerning the moral obligation to comply with the intention of the subsidy
unemployment benets although having a new job already on the horizon. The full texts of these
two scenarios are reported in Appendix B. The results for all three scenarios are very similar.
25The answers to the two other vignettes are also not systematically related to the consumption
of the subsidized good. In a similar regression as in column 7 of Table 7, the interaction terms
are +0.91 units and -1.07 units for the student-support scenario and the unemployment-benet
scenario, respectively. Both are not signicant. The same holds true if we take the average answer





























































Figure 6: Cumulative distribution of the consumption of the subsidized good
for High-Moral-Obligation group (left panel) and Low-Moral-Obligation group (right
panel). The grey line depicts consumption in the Cash treatment, the black line con-
sumption in the Label treatment. In order to form a High-MO group (n=38) and a
Low-MO group (n=53) we elicited moral attitudes via a vignette question concerning
the use of child benets and split the sample at the median.
giver, do not drive our results.
As discussed in the introduction, our ndings have implications for the study of
stock market behavior and life-cycle savings. We furthermore suggest that fungibil-
ity plays an important role in a dierent setting where it has until now not been con-
sidered: the eect of in-kind benets on consumption and market prices. Empirical
studies for the U.S. and for France have shown that a rise in housing benets for low-
income tenants has lead to drastic rent increases (see, e.g., Susin 2002, Fack 2006).26
For the U.S., where not all eligible households do receive the benets, Susin (2002)
nds that housing benets even caused a net loss for low-income households. The
standard explanation for this phenomenon is that the subsidy causes an increase
in housing demand which is met by an inelastic supply. Our ndings suggest that
this is only part of the story. Taking our results at face value, tenants who receive
housing benets will have a higher willingness to pay for a given apartment, com-
pared to tenants who receive the same amount as a cash grant. Landlords who
anticipate this eect can increase the rent accordingly. Laferr ere & Le Blanc (2004)
present evidence from France that supports this view: controlling for apartment and
neighborhood characteristics, landlords discriminate between non-assisted tenants
and tenants who receive housing assistance, charging the latter group signicantly
higher rents. As a result, housing benets do not necessarily make the recipients
26Similarly, Gibbons & Manning (2006) show for the U.K. that a reduction in housing benets
has lead to lower rents.
30better o, but may constitute a transfer payment from taxpayers to landlords. In
our view, this problem can be mitigated by linking housing benets less saliently
to rent payments. The periodicity of the benet payments, for instance, could be
chosen such that it diers from the periodicity of the rent payments. Moreover, one
could design the benet system such that the exact amount of the subsidy depends
on variables which the landlord cannot observe.
There are, however, other benet payments for which it is good news if recipients
violate fungibility. If recipients of child benets do not treat money as fungible,
they will spend more of the subsidy on child-related goods, compared to a situation
in which they receive a cash grant of the same amount.27 This eect has been
documented with data from the Dutch child benets system: Kooreman (2000)
nds that the marginal propensity to consume child clothing out of child benets is
higher than it is out of other income.28 For a similar benet system, Munro (2005)
nds that the unconditional \winter fuel allowance" in the UK has a positive eect
on heating expenditures. These results suggest that public policy can in
uence
consumers in a simple way by explicitly stating the intended use of the subsidy
(Thaler & Sunstein 2003).
Our results do not imply that everybody in every situation will violate fungi-
bility. In our laboratory experiment, treating money as non-fungible is linked to
mathematical abilities and not to preferences, suggesting that this behavior is a
mistake. Once the rational solution becomes obvious to subjects, e.g., by learning
or by explanation, they will probably regret their decision and choose the optimal
solution. The eld experiment shows, however, that also experienced participants
can be in
uenced by a label on the subsidy. In addition, coming back to our previous
example of housing benets, most people make only few housing decisions in their
life; here, the scope for non-rational behavior should be especially large.
27Recipients of child benets are not restricted in their use of these funds and only the name of
the benet payment marks it as a separate income component. But the general argument of this
paper applies if we assume that also merely labeled payments are posted to the mental sub-budget
corresponding to the label.
28Blow et al. (2004), however, analyze data from the U.K. and nd such a labeling eect only
for some of their specications.
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34A Instructions
Welcome to today's decision experiment.
To start, please read these instructions carefully. At the end of the instruc-
tions you will nd some example questions. The experiment starts as soon as all
participants have answered these questions correctly.
Please note that it is not allowed to communicate with other participants of the
experiment from now on. If this should happen, the experiment loses its scientic
value and we have to stop the experiment. If you have any questions, please hold
your hand out of the cubicle; we will then come to you.
The experiment consists of two parts. They will be called work phase and
shopping phase. During the work phase you have the possibility to earn talers.
You can then use these talers for shopping during the shopping phase. The value
your purchases have for you will be denoted in points during the experiment. Di-
rectly after the experiment, the points you achieved will be summed up and paid in
cash to you according to an exchange rate of
1 point = 0.01 euro
In addition, you receive 2.50 euro for having showed up on time. The 2.50 euro
will be paid after the experiment independently of your decisions and additionally
to the amount you earn during the experiment.
Work phase
During the work phase you have the opportunity to earn 100 talers. The work
consists of counting the number of zeros in tables lled with zeros and ones. Below,
you see an example table with 3 rows and 8 columns. The tables used in the
experiment are larger, they contain 10 rows and 30 columns.
Example of work phase
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
35You earn the 100 talers if you succeed in nding the correct number of zeros in
four tables within 15 minutes. If you do not succeed in nding the correct number
of zeros in four tables you earn 10 talers instead.
Work phase screen
 
During the work phase, you will receive eight sheets with zeros and ones. Please
begin on sheet 1 and count the number of zeros on this sheet. Enter the number
of zeros in the input box in the middle of the computer screen. After entering
the number click on the OK-button. If you entered the correct number, you may
continue with sheet 2. If you entered a number that is higher by 1 or lower by 1
than the correct number, your number will also be rated as correct. If you enter
a number that deviates by more than plus/minus 1 from the correct number, your
input will be rated as false. You then have another two tries to enter the correct
number for this sheet. Thus, you have three tries in total for each sheet. In the
top-right hand corner of the screen, you can see the remaining time in seconds. The
time starts at 900 seconds = 15 minutes and counts backwards.
Please note: the red number above the OK-button indicates the number of the
current sheet. If you enter three times a wrong number for a sheet, the counter for
36the current sheet changes to the next sheet. If this occurs, please put the current
sheet aside and start the next one.
You have a total of eight sheets at your disposal. As soon as you found the
correct number of zeros on four sheets, the task is completed successfully and you
receive 100 talers. You then have nished the work phase. If you do not
succeed in completing the task within 15 minutes, you earn 10 talers instead.
Please note: Experience shows that is helpful to mark the 50th, 100th...
counted zero. If you miscount in this case you do not have to start all over again
but you can continue from the last marked zero.
Shopping phase
The shopping phase starts as soon as it has been determined for every participant
if he or she completed the task of the work phase successfully. You will make two
shopping decisions. Your credit balance is split equally between the two decisions.
If you completed the task of the work phase successfully you have 100/2 = 50 talers
at your disposal per purchasing decision, otherwise you have 10/2 = 5 talers.
During the shopping phase you can spend your money on two things that will be
called housing and clothing. You decide which amount of housing and clothing
you want to buy. Expenses for housing denote the rent of the apartment.
The value housing and clothing have for you are expressed in points that are
exchanged into euro at the end of the experiment and paid out to you. How valuable
a specic amount of housing or clothing is for you is denoted in two tables during
the experiment. Below you see an example. In this example numbers of points
and prices take on dierent values than in the experiment. The sole purpose of
this example is to help you become familiar with the procedure of the purchasing
decision.
37Example of shopping phase
Housing Clothing
Units Points Units Points Your credit balance
0 0 0 0 20 talers
1 6 1 16
2 11 2 24 Prices per unit
3 15 3 27 Housing: 4 talers
4 18 4 29 Clothing: 3 talers
5 20 5 30
In the left column of each table, the dierent amounts that are oered for sale
are presented. The right column indicates how many points you get for the purchase
of the corresponding amount. You can read from the table \Housing" that in this
example 0 units of housing have a value of 0 points for you, 1 unit of housing has a
value of 6 points, 2 units 11 points, and so on.
Your credit balance for the purchase is indicated in the top-right panel; in this
example 20 talers. In the bottom-right panel you nd the prices (in talers) for
housing and clothing; prices are per unit. The prices for housing and clothing are
dierent. The table \Prices per unit" shows that in this example a unit of housing
costs 4 talers while clothing costs 3 talers per unit.
In the purchasing decision, you decide how many units of housing and
how many units of clothing you want to buy. You can choose freely how many
units to buy as long as the total price does not exceed your credit balance.
The total price of your purchase is calculated as follows:
Total price of purchase = (units of housing  price per unit of housing)
+ (units of clothing  price per unit of clothing)
As soon as you have decided how many units of housing and how many units of
clothing to buy, it is determined how many points you will get for this decision. If
you do not spend your entire credit balance, the talers not spent are forfeited.
Additionally, talers from the rst purchasing decision cannot be kept for the second
purchasing decision.
The total number of points is calculated as follows:
38Total number of points = points for purchased units of housing
+ points for purchased units of clothing
Example of a purchase
In the example mentioned above, you have a credit balance of
20 talers. Imagine you wanted to buy 3 units of housing and
2 units of clothing. Then you have to pay [(3  price per unit of
housing) + (2  price per unit of clothing)] talers, i.e., 12+6 = 18
talers. This purchase is possible with your credit balance.
In the tables, you nd the number of points you get for this
purchase. You get 15 points for 3 units of housing and 24
points for 2 units of clothing. Your purchase would thus earn
you 15 + 24 = 39 points
Please note: It is only possible to buy one amount of each good. For example,
if you want to buy altogether 4 units of clothing, the point value that is noted next to
the number 4 (29 points) matters for you. You cannot buy rst one unit of clothing
and then another 3 units of clothing, for example.
On the computer, you make your decisions on the input screen of the shopping
phase. Below you see a screen shot of this input screen. The screen contains all
information that you need for your decision: tables for the point values of housing
and clothing, your credit balance and the prices per unit. The actual point values
and prices used in the experiment have been replaced with \XXX".
39Shopping phase screen
 
In the bottom-right hand corner of the screen, you can see two input elds. After
having decided how many units of housing and of clothing to buy you enter your
decision in these two elds and conrm your choice by clicking on the OK-button.
After having clicked on the OK-button you cannot change your decision
anymore. Your decision will be shown again on the screen. Please write your
decision on the decision sheet that was handed out with these instructions. If you
click on the OK-button although you would spend more talers than you have at
your disposal, an error message is displayed and you have the possibility to correct
your decision.
If you have any questions please hold your hand out of the cubicle; we will then
come to you.
When all participants have answered the example questions correctly, the experi-
ment starts with the working phase. When all participants have nished the working
phase, you will be presented again short instructions for the rst purchasing deci-
sion on the computer screen. Also for the second purchasing decision, the screen will
show short instructions. As soon as all participants have taken the second purchas-
ing decision the computer screen shows a questionnaire. After the questionnaire,
40the experiment is over.
Please answer the example questions handed out with these instructions before
the experiment starts.
On-screen Instructions
Before the Working Phase
The working phase is about to start now. If you succeed in counting the correct
number of zeros on four sheets within 15 minutes, you have completed the task
successfully and you get 100 talers. If you do not succeed in completing the task
successfully you get 10 talers instead.
Please click on the OK-button to start the working phase.
Before the First Purchasing Decision
You completed the task successfully. Your credit balance per purchasing
decision is thus 50 talers.
In the following shopping phase you will make two purchasing decisions.
You decide how many units of housing and how many units of clothing to buy.
You can read from the tables on the screen how many points you will get for your
decision. If you do not spend all your credit balance, the talers not spent will be
forfeited.
Before the Second Purchasing Decision
Lab Label treatment
For the second purchasing decision, you get a housing subsidy of 30 talers in
addition to your credit balance of 50 talers. You can spend the housing subsidy
only on housing.
If the amount you spend on housing is lower than the amount of the housing
subsidy, i.e., lower than 30 talers, the part of the subsidy that is not spent is for-
feited.
41The housing subsidy is the only dierence compared to the rst purchasing
decision. All prices and point values remain the same.
Please note: When entering your purchasing decision, please report the total
number of units you buy, no matter whether you paid them out of your own credit
balance or out of the housing subsidy.
Lab Cash treatment
For the second purchasing decision, you get a subsidy of 30 talers in addition to
your credit balance of 50 talers. You can spend the subsidy on housing, on clothing
or on both.
If you do not spend the whole subsidy, the part of it that is not spent is forfeited.
The subsidy is the only dierence compared to the rst purchasing decision.
All prices and point values remain the same.
Please note: When entering your purchase decision, please report the total
number of units you buy, no matter whether you paid them out of your own credit
balance or out of the subsidy.
42B Moral Obligation Vignettes
Student-Support Scenario
Mr Smith is a rst-year Biology student who wants to apply for Baf og.29
When he reads up on Baf og he notices that he has to specify the income
of his parents and additionally his own wealth. He recently received part
of his bequest, amounting to 32 000 euro. If he declares this amount his
application will be rejected. He decides to not declare the bequest in his
application in order to receive Baf og anyway.
What do you think about the behavior of Mr Smith on a scale from 1 to 6, where 1
means \Not appropriate at all" and 6 \Completely appropriate"?
Unemployment-Benet Scenario
Ms Newman has nished her studies of Law and is looking for a job. She
has already found one but this position is only available in three months.
She knows that she is eligible for unemployment benet. She could easily
bridge the time until the job starts since she has savings of 10 000 euro.
Additionally, her parents support her with 800 euro per month until the
new job starts. Ms Newman decides to claim unemployment benet in
addition, amounting to 300 euro per month.
What do you think about the behavior of Ms Newman on a scale from 1 to 6, where 1
means \Not appropriate at all" and 6 \Completely appropriate"?
29\Baf og" is the student support provided by the state in Germany. The amount depends on
own income, own wealth and parents' income.
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